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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
An award of attorney fees would benefit Call, 
personally, because he has realized only 1/3 of his 
actual loss. An award of attorney fees would also 
benefit the attorney personally; however, the 
United States Supreme Court has permitted such 
claims under the common fund doctrine. 
POINT II: 
Call has asked to join additional parties under 
Rules 19 and 21. West Jordan's response is that 
the class certification was denied; therefore, 
there can be no joinder. That argument is not 
supported by any authority and is not taken in good 
faith. 
POINT III: 
Call claims that there was never any evidence that 
a public hearing was held. West Jordan does not 
marshal1 any evidence. Rather, West Jordan simply 
says that the lower court agreed. There is no good 
faith basis for West Jordan's curious argument. 
POINT IV: 
West Jordan's bad faith was not only exhibited in 
the trial court, the bad faith has continued in the 
processing of this appeal. 
POINT V: 
Contrary to Call's claims, the preliminary master's 
report criticizes West Jordan's accounting 
procedures. Furthermore, it made no economic sense 
for Call to invest $18,400 on a final master's 
report in hopes of winning $16,576. 
POINT VI: 
The Supreme Court mandated the trial court to ". . 
. enter judgment consistent with this opinion." 
The civil rights claim is "consistent with this 
opinion. " Therefore, Call was entitled to a 
judgment on his civil rights claim. 
POINT VII: 
Call's civil rights claim was raised by the 
pleadings. However, it became moot when the trial 
court originally ruled that a public hearing had 
been held. 
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POINT I 
THERE IS NOTHING EVIL ABOUT 
AN ATTORNEY WHO WANTS TO BE PAID 
West Jordan makes much of the fact that the attor-
ney's fee issue will benefit Call's attorney personally. 
(Brief of Respondent, at p. 10, 17, 23.) 
It is simply not true that an award of attorney 
fees will only benefit the attorney. The client (Call) has 
already paid his attorney's fee. If the Court awards 
attorney fees, the clients gets a refund; and the trial court 
was so advised. (September 11 Tr., at p. 3.) In this case, 
the judgment (before interest) was $16,576. (R. 1977.) 
However, after attorney fees and costs, Call, personally, 
got only about one-third of that amount-'-. (Compare R. 1854 
and R. 1987.) It is no wonder that Call (personally) is 
interested in the attorney's fee award-
Of course, the attorney would also personally 
benefit from an award of attorney fees. In this case, Call's 
attorney earned substantially less than five dollars ($5.00) 
Judgment before interest: $16,576.00 
One-third contingent fee: 5,500.00 
Accounting fees and Master fees: 5,245.00 
Net: $ 5,831.00 
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per hour for his ten years of work^. There is nothing wrong 
with an attorney who wants to be paid. The Supreme Court of 
the United States has called this the common fund doctrine. 
The common fund doctrine operates when a lawyer 
creates, increases or preserves a fund, and other persons 
benefit from that f und^. In such a situation, the U.S. 
Supreme* Court has held that a successful plaintiff can assert 
a claim for payment of legal expenses, including attorney 
fees, from the common fund. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 
527 (1881)- See also, Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettis, 
113 U.S. 116 (1885); Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 
U.S. 161 (1939). 
^Call's attorney accepted the case on a contingent fee. 
(R. 1854). As such, the attorney accepted the risk of 
losing. However, the attorney did not accept the risk of 
West Jordan's bad faith which mushroomed the litigation. 
JThe common fund was created when the Utah Supreme 
Court declared that the 7% fees were held in trust. (Call I, 
at p. 320.) Because West Jordan illegally collected the fund 
(See Call III), the monies must now be returned to those who 
paid into the fund. (See cases collected at Brief of 
Appellant, at p. 24.) The trouble is that, except for Call 
personally, West Jordan hasn't refunded a dime to anyone. 
Nor is it likely that other subdividers even know of their 
rights. Therefore, the necessity to add parties under Rules 
19 and 21. (See Point II below.) 
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The traditional common fund model was first set 
forth in Trustees v. Greenough, supra. In that case, Florida 
had transferred millions of acres of state land to certain 
trustees. The plaintiff alleged dissipation of the assets of 
the trust. The plaintiff also alleged a collusive sale of 
hundreds of thousands of acres land. The plaintiff pre-
vailed. In awarding attorney's fees, the Court stated: 
It would be very hard on the plaintiff to 
turn him away without any allowance 
except the paltry sum which could be 
taxed under the fee bill. It would not 
only be unjust to him, but it would give 
to the other parties entitled to 
participate in the benefits of the fund 
an unfair advantage. He has worked for 
them as well as for himself; and if he 
cannot be reimbursed out of the fund 
itself, they ought to contribute their 
due proportion of the expenses which he 
has fairly incurred. To make them a 
charge upon the fund is the most 
equitable way of securing such contribu-
tion. 
Greenough, at 532. 
Four years later, Greenough was expanded in Central 
R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettis, supra. The original action was 
a complaint brought in an Alabama state court to reach the 
assets of the debtor, a railroad. The original action had 
been framed as a class action. After successfully reaching 
the assets of the railroad, the attorneys for the plaintiff 
petitioned for fees directly from the fund. The Supreme 
Court held in favor of the attorneys- The court first held 
that the lawyers had standing to claim a fee directly from 
the fund. 
When an allowance to the complainant (out 
of the common fund) is proper on account 
of solicitor's fees, it may be made 
directly by the solicitors themselves 
without any application by their 
immediate client. 
Id. at 124-25. 
Next, the court concluded that the attorneys were 
entitled to attorney fees. 
The creditors who are entitled to the 
benefit of the decree had only to await 
its execution in order to receive the 
full amount of their claims; and that 
result was due to the skill and diligence 
of the attorneys, so far as a result of 
the litigation can, in any case, be 
referred to the labors of counsel. 
[accordingly, counsel were] entitled to 
reasonable compensation for their profes-
sional services in establishing a lien, 
on behalf of the unsecured creditors. 
Id. at 126-27. 
The third case, which establishes the basic prin-
ciples of the common fund doctrine is Sprague v. Ticonic 
Natl. Bank, supra, an opinion by Justice Frankfurter. In 
Sprague, the plaintiff established a trust with the defendant 
bank. The bank secured the trust with certain bonds. The 
security for the bonds was in dispute. Sprague brought a 
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successful suit to establish her own right, (as one of the 
beneficiaries) to share in the proceeds of the bonds. Having 
established her own right to share in the bond proceeds, 
Sprague petitioned for reimbursement of her counsel fees to 
be paid from the fund. Unlike Greenough and Pettis, Sprague 
had only indirectly established the rights of others when she 
obtained a decree for her own individual relief: 
When such a fund is for all practical 
purposes created for the benefit of 
others, the formalities of the litiga-
tion—the absence of an avowed class 
suit or the creation of a fund, as it 
were, through stare decisis rather than 
through a decree—hardly touch the power 
or equity in doing justice as between a 
party and the beneficiaries of his 
litigation. 
Id. at 166. 
Every federal court and, virtually, every state 
court^ follows the "common fund" line of reasoning in 
awarding attorney's fees. See e.g., Robison v. Katz, 717 
P.2d 586 (N.M. 1986); Guild, Hagen & Clark, Ltd. v. First 
National Bank of Nevada, 600 P.2d 238 (Nev. 1979); Moses v. 
qThe common fund doctrine has never been adopted or 
rejected in Utah. The issue has simply not come up. See 
Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Mgt., 645 P.2d 667, 671 n.l 
(Utah 1982). However, it seems likely that our Supreme Court 
will follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court on 
that issue. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness 
Society, 421 U.S. 240, 257-260 (1975). 
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McGarvey, 614 P.2d 1363 (Ak. 1980); Means v. Montana Power 
Co. >. 625 P.2d 32 (Mon. 1981). 
In summary, Call (personally) has every right to 
press for attorney fees and joinder of other parties. Call's 
attorney (personally) also has every right to press for 
attorney fees and joinder. 
POINT II 
WEST JORDAN HAS MADE NO 
GOOD FAITH ARGUMENT ON THE JOINDER ISSUE 
Call argued that the trial court should have joined 
additional parties. (Brief of Appellant, at p. 23)5. In 
response, West Jordan makes a curious argument. West Jordan 
says there can be no joinder because the Supreme Court denied 
class certification. (Brief of Respondent, at p. 22.) 
West Jordan completely ignored cases cited by Call 
in which joinder was triggered after class certification was 
denied. Mathies v. Seymour, 270 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1959); 
Stevens v. Loomis, 334 F.2d 775, 778 n.9 (1st Cir. 1964). 
5Rule 21, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states: 
Parties may be dropped or added by order 
of the court on motion of any party or on 
its own initiative at any time. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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See also, Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310 F.Supp. 248 (D. Neb. 
1970); and Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, 329 F.2d 
909 (9th Cir. 1964)(dictum). 
Likewise, West Jordan completely ignored binding 
precedent from the Utah Supreme Court which requires joinder 
of necessary parties at the latest possible stage of the 
litigation- Hiltsey v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1987). 
Furthermore, West Jordan completely ignored the 
fact that our Supreme Court declared, in this very case, 
that West Jordan is holding the money of all developers in 
trust (Call I, at p. 320), Finally, West Jordan has ignored 
the absolute legal duty of a trustee to disgorge the trust 
funds if the trust fails. (See cases collected at Brief of 
Appellant, p. 24.) 
There is simply no good faith basis for West 
Jordan's argument that adding parties (Rules 19 and 21) is 
somehow the same as a class action (Rule 23). The relation-
ship between Rules 19, 21 and 23 is described as follows: 
Interpleader, intervention, and use of 
the class actions are several methods of 
permissive joinder of parties, but each 
has its own distinctive properties. . . 
The rules regarding class actions and 
permissive joinder are similar in that 
before joinder or a class action is 
proper, there must be common questions of 
law or fact. The rules differ, of 
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course, in that a finite number of 
persons are joined under F.R.C.P. 20, 
while a class action is maintainable only 
if the class is so numerous that joinder 
of all members of the class is imprac-
ticable. 
A named plaintiff in a purported 
class action may move for the joinder 
under F.R.C.P. 20 of additional named 
plaintiffs who would otherwise be poten-
tial class members, however, such repre-
sentation is not necessary if class cer-
tification is granted, and may not be 
permitted if it is prejudicial. Alterna-
tively, if class certification is denied, 
joinder of parties under F.R.C.P. 20 may 
still be available. . .(Emphasis added.) 
26 Fed Proc, L.Ed. §59.148. 
There is no showing on this record that other 
developers even know about this case (or their right to a 
refund). Thus, they cannot file their own lawsuits. If the 
developers are not joined under Rules 19 and 21, West Jordan 
will keep its ill-gotten gains because of the sheer luck 
that the other developers don't know they were cheated.^ 
bIn legal terms, West Jordan's position is that a 
trustee has no duty to disgorge the corpus of an illegal 
trust so long as the settlors of the trust don't learn of the 
illegality and make separate and independent claims. 
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POINT III 
WEST JORDAN HAS NOT CITED A 
SINGLE IOTA OF EVIDENCE TO SHOW A 
GOOD FAITH BASIS FOR THE UNDERLYING LITIGATION 
Call claims that West Jordan did not have a good 
faith basis for its claims that a public hearing had been 
held. (See Brief of Appellant, at p. 19.) It would have 
been helpful if West Jordan's Brief had cited the evidence 
upon which it relied to form its good faith belief. However, 
West Jordan has not cited one iota of evidence to show its 
basis for any good faith belief. Thus, this court is left in 
the dark as to exactly what West Jordan's good faith basis 
might have been. 
Federal court's regularly demand some factual 
showing that a party has made some good faith investigation. 
See e.g., Thomas v. Capital Security Services, Inc., 836 
F.2d 866, 875 (5th Cir. 1988)7. If counsel for West Jordan 
had done any minimal fact investigation, he would have 
discovered that no public hearing had ever been held. In 
Florida Monument Builders v. All Faith's Memorial Gardens, 
605 F.Supp. 1324, 1326 (S.D. Fla. 1984), sanctions were 
imposed where counsel, among other things, failed to examine 
7
 Thomas also holds that the trial court must award 
sanctions once a violation of Rule 11 is found. 
11 
pertinent public records available in the State Capitol. 
Cf. Fuji Photo Film U.S.A.
 y Inc. v. Aero Mayflower Transit 
Co, , 112 F.R.D. 664, 668 (S.D. N.Y. 1986)(counsel failed to 
check state records to see if potential defendant was a 
corporation). 
Rather than presenting a factual basis to support 
its good faith, West Jordan has relied upon pure legal 
argument. West Jordan claims that there can be no bad faith 
because West Jordan won in the trial court (Brief of 
Respondent, at p. 19-20)**. West Jordan cites no authority 
for that novel argument. On the contrary, there are numerous 
cases which hold that an appellate court can reverse a trial 
court on a Rule 11 issue. See e.g. , Thomas v. Capital 
Security Services, Inc., supra; Eastway Const. Corp. v. City 
of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985); Westmoreland v. 
C.B.S., 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
bSpecifically, West Jordan says: 
In any event, the finding of the trial 
court (Judge Dee) that a public hearing 
had been held vitiates any and all claims 
that the defendant's defense was asserted 
or maintained in bad faith." 
(Brief of Respondent, at p. 20.) 
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Indeed, if the trial court denies sanctions without 
any justification in the record, the appellate court should 
make a rigorous review, Thomas v. Capitol Security Services, 
Inc., supra, at p. 883. 
It is true that Judge Dee sided with West Jordan at 
trial. However, Judge Dee's vote does not necessarily mean 
that West Jordan acted in good faith. Rather, the opposite 
is equally possible. Perhaps, West Jordan's bad faith was so 
successful that Judge Dee was fooled. 
It is for that reason that many Federal courts 
review Rule 11 issues on a de novo basis. See Hudson v. 
Moore Business Forms, Inc., 827 F.2d 450, 452-453 (9th Cir. 
1987). Other courts adopt a three-tier approach: The 
findings of fact supporting the trial court's decision are 
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard^; the legal 
conclusion that the facts constitute a Rule 11 violation are 
reviewed de novo; and, the amount and type of sanctions are 
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Zalvidar v. 
City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986); 
Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1987); 
^Here the trial court made no findings. It merely 
denied the motion. Cf. Thomas v. Capital Security Savings, 
supra., at p. 882-883. 
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Eastway Construction Corp, v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 
254n.7 (2d Cir. 1985); Westmoreland v. C.B.S., supra. 
This has been an enormously complex, expensive, 
and protracted litigation. However, at bottom lies a simple 
fact issue. Did West Jordan hold the required public 
hearing? The answer is that there was never anything 
remotely akin to a public hearing. If West Jordan had 
admitted that simple fact, Call could have saved years of 
time and substantial attorney fees. West Jordan should now 
pay for its bad faith. 
POINT IV 
WEST JORDAN'S BAD FAITH CONTINUES 
Call claims that West Jordan delayed this case for 
several years by its frivolous claim that a public hearing 
had been held1^. (See Point III, above.) However, the bad 
faith continues throughout the post-trial motions and this 
appeal. 
^Actually, West Jordan switched its position on the 
"public hearing" at trial. During all of the discovery, West 
Jordan had relied on a meeting of January 21, 1975. At 
trial, West Jordan suddenly switched its position and relied 
on the August 27, 1974 Master Plan meeting. The last second 
switch in strategy violated a prior court order, and is 
further evidence of West Jordan's pattern of bad faith. (R. 
1179, 1851-1853.) 
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First, during the post-remand motions, Call moved 
for a judgment on the civil rights claim. See Point I, 
above. During the briefing on that issue, West Jordan relied 
on the doctrine of "qualified immunity." West Jordan relied 
on the case of Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 
659 (1978). However, Call has demonstrated that West 
Jordan's reliance on the doctrine of "qualified immunity" is 
totally frivolous. (See Exhibit A.) 
Second, in the briefing of this appeal, West Jordan 
again dug up the case of Monnell v. Dept. of Social Services, 
supra. This time, West Jordan argued that Monnell can not be 
applied retroactively. (Brief of Respondent, at p. 16.) 
West Jordan's retroactivity argument is also totally 
frivolous. See Tosti v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1485 
(9th Cir. 1984). 
Third, in this appeal, West Jordan argued that 
adding parties (Rules 19 and 21, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure) is the same thing as class certification (Rule 23, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Point II above.) The 
argument is totally frivolous. West Jordan cited absolutely 
no authority—and, indeed, no reasoning to support the novel 
argument. 
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Fourth, in this appeal, West Jordan argued that an 
appellate court cannot overrule a trial court judge on 
issues of bad faith. (See Point III, above.) Again, West 
Jordan cited no authority and no reasoning to support the 
novel argument. 
Fifth, throughout its brief, West Jordan set forth 
a highly biased and highly distorted procedural history. 
However, West Jordan failed to make a single citation to the 
record! See Rule 24(e), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
For example, West Jordan continually argues that it never 
presented its case-in-chief at trial. (See Brief of 
Respondent at p. 6, 14, 19.) That is simply incorrect. In 
Call III, at p. 181, the Supreme Court stated: 
Because of problems encountered by the 
plaintiffs in its discovery of informa-
tion in the possession of West Jordan and 
because of our decision in Banberry 
Development Corp. v. South Jordan City, 
631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981), the trial court 
issued a pretrial order which placed upon 
West Jordan the burden of producing 
evidence on several issues. . . 
(Compare Exhibit B.) The Supreme Court also issued a writ of 
mandamus prohibiting the trial court from reopening West 
Jordan's case-in-chief. (See Exhibit C). For West Jordan to 
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continue, to this very day, to claim that it was prevented 
from presenting evidence is egregious bad faith. 
Sixth, in this appeal, West Jordan argues (without 
citation to the record) that it was unfairly prevented from 
arguing that Call had not paid the 7% fee under protest. 
(Brief of Resp. at p. 14.) Again, this is a totally 
frivolous argument because Call was not required to pay under 
protest. See Cox v. Utah Mtq. & Loan, 716 P. 2d 783 (Utah 
1986). Moreover, our Supreme Court ruled that the 7% fee is 
not a tax. (Call I, at p. 220-221.) Therefore, no protest 
was necessary. See §59-2-1411, Utah Code Ann. Nor, was this 
issue ever preserved in the pleadings. (See R. 344-346.) In 
any case, since the Utah Supreme Court ordered that judgment 
be entered in favor of Call, it is far too late for West 
Jordan to raise the issue of payment under protest. 
Seventh, in this appeal, West Jordan argues 
(without any citation to the record) that the Master was only 
required because Call's counsel "continued to 'play dumb' by 
claiming the records of the City were unintelligible to him" 
(Brief of Resp. at p. 20). There was no good faith basis for 
that argument. On this issue, the Master has stated: 
Since this information is not provided in 
the existing accounting records, it will 
have to come from other records and, 
again, from the help of a trained 
17 
engineer. It is also possible that such 
information may not be available at all 
for some transactions, therefore, the 
analysis would be impossible* 
(Exhibit D at p. 7.) 
POINT V 
WEST JORDAN MISREPRESENTED THE MASTER'S REPORT 
Call asked for a refund of master fees and 
accounting fees. Brief of Appellant, at p. 2711. West 
Jordan replied that Call had waived the final master's report 
(Brief of Respondent, at p. 21.) West Jordan does not 
explain why or how such a waiver should make any difference 
as to who should pay costs. 
The master's report is included at Exhibit D. As 
the court will see, the cost of the final report would have 
been $12,400 to $18,900. (Exhibit D, at p. 10.) The 
potential recovery was only $16,576 (Call I, at p. 221). It 
would make little sense for Call to risk $18,900 in addition 
to attorney fees for a chance to win $16,57 6. Thus, Call had 
no practical alternative. He had to waive the expensive 
final report. However, the preliminary report of the master 
-'--'•The verified Memorandum of Costs is at R.1978 and 
1994. 
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was used in both the trial and on appeal (R. 1231-12 32 and 
Brief of Appellant, Utah Supreme Court, Case No. 19186.) 
Thus, the final master's report was not needed. The 
preliminary master's report was all the ammunition Call 
needed. 
West Jordan also claims (without any citation to 
the record) that, "The master found nothing wrong with the 
City's records." (Brief of Respondent, at p. 21.) In fact, 
the master criticized West Jordan's records as being in 
violation of the Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act. 
(Section 10-10-29, Utah Code Ann. ) (See Exhibit D, at p. 7 
and 8.) If the records had been kept in the proper fashion, 
the cost of the final master's report would have been 10 to 
20% less (Exhibit D, at p. 11.) 
West Jordan also argues that, "the plaintiff lost 
on the master type issues." It is true that the trial court 
ruled against Call on those issues. However, Call appealed. 
On appeal, the supreme court did not reach the accounting 
issues. (Call III, at p. 181.) This court is welcome to 
review the briefs in Call III, de novo. Such a review would 
reveal that Call would have easily won the accounting issues 
if the supreme court had reached those issues. 
19 
However, there is an easier way to reach the same 
result. The master's fees and the accounting fees were 
necessary to pursue an alternative theory of recovery.H 
However, that alternative theory should not have been 
necessary. If West Jordan had, in good faith, admitted that 
no public hearing had been held; Call would not have needed 
to pursue that alternate theory with its associated account-
ing costs. Judgment should have been entered years ago on 
the simple basis that no public hearing was held. (See Point 
III, above.) Thus, the master's fees and the accounting fees 
should be allowed under Rule 11 U.R.C.P. if not under Rule 
54(d), (See Point III, above.) 
J-^ The first theory of recovery was simply that no public 
hearing had been held. Therefore, West Jordan lacked power 
to exact the fee. (See Call III, at p. 181.) No master or 
accountant was necessary to present this first theory. 
The second theory of recovery was that the 7% taken 
from Call had no reasonable relationship to the flood control 
and recreation needs created by the new subdivision. (See 
Call II.) This theory involved substantial accounting 
testimony. 
The theories are overlapping. That is to say Call 
need prevail on either (but not both) of the alternative 
theories to win the case. Call III found in Call's favor on 
the first theory (no public hearing). Therefore, the Supreme 
Court had no reason to rule on the second theory (no 
reasonably relationship). 
20 
POINT VI 
CALL'S CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM IS 
WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE SUPREME COURT'S MANDATE 
Call's opening brief argued that the trial court 
should have entered judgment on the civil rights claim. 
(Brief of Appellant, at p. 9-15.) In reply, West Jordan 
cited numerous authorities for the proposition that the trial 
court must strictly follow the mandate of the Supreme Court. 
(Brief of Respondent, at p. 8-14.) 
Call agrees. The trial court has no power to 
change or vary the mandate of the Supreme Court. The mandate 
of the Supreme Court is, ". . .to enter judgment consistent 
with this opinion." Call III at p. 184. Thus, the question 
is what judgment or judgments are "consistent with this 
opinion." 
It is immediately apparent that the decision in 
Call III only decided a single fact issue! The single fact 
issue decided in Call III was that no public hearing was 
held in connection with City Ordinance No. 33, §9-C-8(2). 
Therefore, the mandate of the Supreme Court is to ". . .enter 
judgment consistent with [the fact that no public hearing was 
held]. " 
21 
The trial court granted a judgment refunding the 
monies paid (R. 1976-1977), However, there was absolutely 
no basis for the trial court to single out one particular 
remedy (viz. a refund) while excluding other remedies (viz. 
civil rights). 
Call's civil rights claim was raised by the 
pleadings (R. 331
 f at para- 38), Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court's fact finding (viz, that no public hearing had been 
held) is consistent with Call's civil rights claim. (See 
Brief of Appellant, at p. 9-15.) Since the civil rights 
claim is "consistent with this opinion," the trial court 
should have entered a judgment granting relief under the 
civil rights claim. 
The case of -Costa v. Sunn, 697 P.2d 43 (Haw. App-
1985) is squarely on point. In the first appeal1^ the 
Hawaii Supreme Court declared that certain state welfare 
rules were invalid because no public hearing was held. (Just 
as in Call III.) The Hawaii Supreme Court remanded with 
instructions, ". . .for entry of a judgment consistent with 
this opinion." (Just as in Call III.) Upon remand, the 
trial court entered a judgment that the new welfare rules 
13Costa v. Sunn, 642 P.2d 530 (Haw. 1982). 
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were invalid. (Just as in Call III.) However, the trial 
court went further. The trial court reinstated the old 
welfare rules and ordered retroactive benefits to be paid 
pursuant to the old rules. The State appealed. On the 
second appeal, the State argued that the trial court had no 
power under the mandate (viz. "to enter judgment consistent 
with this opinion") to award affirmative relief for money 
damages. The appellate court easily disposed of the argument 
by stating: "DSSH's argument that the action of the circuit 
court is not authorized by the remand is without merit." 
Costa, supra at p. 47 n. 8. 
In summary, the mandate was, "• . .to enter 
judgment consistent with the opinion." (Call III at p. 184.) 
Since the civil rights claim is ". • .consistent with this 
opinion," the trial court had no discretion. The trial court 
was bound to enter judgment on the civil rights claim. 
POINT VII 
CALL DID NOT WAIVE 
HIS CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM 
West Jordan argues that Call's civil rights claim 
was waived-^. Specifically, West Jordan says that the civil 
-^Apparently, West Jordan concedes that a civil rights 
violation occurred. West Jordan's only response is the 
procedural defense of waiver; and the argument on retroac-
tivity. (See p. 13 and 19 above.) 
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rights claim was not argued to the trial court or to the 
Supreme Court, (Respondent's Brief, at p. 15.) 
The only specific fact necessary to support the 
civil rights claim was that no public hearing was held- (See 
Brief of Appellant, at p. 10-15.) West Jordan had the burden 
of proof to establish the fact that a public hearing had, in 
fact, been held (Exhibit B at para. 2D). The trial court 
ruled that West Jordan sustained the burden: or in other 
words, the trial court ruled that a public hearing had been 
held. (R. 1496, at para. 22.) 
Because of the trial court's fact finding (viz. 
that a public hearing had been held) legal argument on the 
civil rights claim was moot. It was only when the Supreme 
Court reversed the trial court's fact finding (viz. that no 
public hearing was held) that the civil rights issue became 
ripe for further consideration. 
Costa v. Sunn, supra is again on point. In Costa, 
there was no argument in the first trial or on the first 
appeal that the state should grant money damages under the 
old welfare rules. The only issue in the first trial and 
first appeal was that the new welfare rules should be 
24 
nullified. However, after the Hawaii Supreme Court nullified 
the new welfare rules, the trial court went further to grant 
all legal relief (viz. money damages) which logically flowed 
from that finding. On appeal, the State argued that the 
mandate of the Supreme Court did not permit the new issues. 
The appellate court easily affirmed the lower court's action. 
CONCLUSION 
This case should be remanded with instructions for 
the trial court to: 
1. Assess bad faith damages against West Jordan. 
2. Join all other developers who paid 7% into the 
illegal fund. 
3. Enter a judgment on Call's civil rights claim. 
4. Increase the costs allowed to Call to allow 
for the master's report and the accounting fees. 
DATED this 30 day of ~JUv£ , 1988. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on the ^  \)f) day of <-^y. f/<nt T 
1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANTS' 
REPLY BRIEF, was mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing a 
copy of the same in the U.S. mail, to the following: 
Stephen G. Homer 
West Jordan City Attorney 
1850 West 7800 South 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
/ek/jc 
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EXHIBIT A 
»«* SEP3D 9 n W 8 
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4001 South 700 East, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
t^Hit^ 
BY** 
•;L'J,^Y CLEW 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CALL AND 
CLARK JENKINS, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, ] 
Defendant. ; 
| AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT J. | DEBRY IN SUPPORT OF | ATTORNEY FEES FOR BAD | FAITH RELIANCE ON | QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
| Civil No. C78-829 
| JUDGE PAT BRIAN 
ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
My name is Robert J. DeBry. I give the following 
testimony under oath. 
1. I am the attorney for plaintiffs in this 
action. 
2. On or about September 9, 1987, defendant 
filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs ' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
3. As a part of that memorandum, defendant argued 
that the City of West Jordan was entitled to "qualified 
immunity." Defendant relied on the case of Monell v. Dept. 
of Social Services,. 436 U.S. 659 (1978). 
4. The evening before the hearing, I had retired 
to bed early, and I was reviewing the briefs in preparation 
for the hearing the next morning. When I came upon the 
argument regarding "qualified immunity," I realized that I 
was on unfamiliar terrain. Therefore, I got out of bed and 
went to the Law School Library. 
5. I found that Monell is a very lengthy opinion 
which doesn't discuss "qualified immunity" at all. However, 
I was concerned that I may miss something, so I shepardized 
Monell. That review led me to Owen v. City of Independence, 
445 U.S. 621, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673. 
Owen does discuss the doctrine of "qualified 
immunity" as that relates to a municipality. However, Owen 
holds squarely that municipalities do not have such 
immunity. At 100 S.Ct. 1415, the Court holds: 
In sum, we can discern no "tradition so 
well grounded in history and reason" 
that would warrant the conclusion that 
in enacting 1 of the Civil Rights Act, 
the 42d Congress sub silentio extended 
to municipalities a qualified immunity 
based on the good faith of their 
officers. Absent any clearer indication 
that Congress intended so to limit the 
reach of a statute expressly designed to 
provide a "broad remedy for violations 
of federally protected civil rights," 
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social 
Services, 436 U.S., at 685, 98 S.Ct. at 
2033, we are unwilling to suppose that 
injuries occasioned by a municipality's 
unconstitutional conduct were not also 
meant to be fully redressable through 
its sweep. 
2 
6. During the course of argument, West Jordan's 
attorney stated: 
. . .1 am not going to pat myself on the 
back, but I am [familiar] with these 
things because cities somehow are being 
sued under civil rights, so I, as City 
Attorney have to pay attention to these 
things. . . 
7. Virtually all cases in our office are done on 
a contingent fee, thus I have no established hourly fee. 
However, it is my observation that senior experienced 
litigators in this community are paid $100-150 per hour. 
8. I have spent five hours (including three 
hours library time) in preparing and arguing this motion. 
DATED this ^fe day of C^ Zt , 1987. 
of L^l ^SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE me this df day 1 "*• , 1987. 
ires: 
f 
8 : PUBLIC 
X*^ \ Commission expires .* r^u 
\ \ Aus.27.ttB8 ..' P 
NOfAR^ PUBLIC ]~ 
Residing at: 
&\~7\OAM^J 
3 
EXHIBIT B 
ROBERT J. DESRY 4 ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
965 East 4800 South 12 
Salt LaXe City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CALL and CLARX JENKINS 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiffs* Renewed Motion for Sanctions (July 29, 1982) 
was heard on August 6, 1982. Plaintiffs were represented by 
Robert J. Deary. Defendant was represented by Stephen Homer. 
After considering the arguments of counsel, it is hereby ordered 
that: 
1* The trial is hereby bifurcated into two phases. 
2* At the first phase, defendant shall have the burden 
of producing evidence on the following issuesi 
A. Defendant to provide an accounting of the trust: fundSr 
paid to defendant in the form of a 7\ subdivided a fee. The 
accounting should, intor alia, specify how defendant has spent 
the 7\ subdivision fees paid by plaintiffs. The accounting shall 
also compare how defendant has spent the 1\ fees received froa tho. 
other subdivisions listed in Defendant's Response to Discovery 
dated May 2S, 1982, Call v. Citv of west Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 220 
(Ut. 1979). j 
B. Defendant to disclose the calculations upon which it 
relics to assure that tho 7% fees are within the standard of 
reasonableness. This shall, inter alia, include the data upon 
which defendant relics to show that 71 (as opposed to 10% or some 
other amount) is a reasonable amount. This shall further include 
the data upon which defendant relics to show that the newly 
A M E N D E D 
O R D E R 
C i v i l No. C-78-829 
APPENDIX "H" 1 4 ' ? £ 
developed properties bear their equitable share of costs in 
relation to benefits conferred. Oanbcrry Oev. Corp, v. South 
Jordan City, 631 P.2d 889, 904 (Ut. 1981). 
C. Whether the 7% subdivision fee was in practice used as 
a reasonable charge for a specific purpose, or whether it was in 
practice used as a general fee that amounts to a revenue measure. 
Laffertv v. Pavson City, 642 P.2d 376, 378 (Ut. 1982). 
0. Whether Section 9-C-8I2) of west Jordan City Ordinance 
33 was prepared by the Planning and Honing Commission, and whether 
a public hearing was held prior to promulgating the ordinance. 
Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 219 (Ut. 1979). 
3- Plaintiffs may reserve all cross-examination on the-
foregoing issues until the second phase of the trial. 
4. After defendant has introduced its evidence, the trial 
shall be recessed for a period convenient to the Court, but no 
less than- thirty (30) days. After the Court resumes session, 
plaintiffs may conduct, their cross-examination of defendant* 
witnesses. 
5- After plaintiffs have conducted their cross-examination 
and after allowing for appropriate rc-direct and re-cross, examina-
tion^ plaintiffs shall proceed to put on their case-in-chief. 
&• This second, phase of the trial shall include the 
theories listed below. Plaintiffs shall have the burden of proof 
rfith respect to each matter listed below: 
A* Whether the 7% fee required of plaintiffs had any 
reasonable relationship to the nco\ls for flood control, parxs, anc 
recreation facilities created by their subdivision. Call v. City 
of west Jordan. 614 P.2d 1257, 1259 (Ut. 1979); Banberrv Oev. 
Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 903 (Ut. 1981). 
B. Whether the 7\ fee has required the newly developed 
properties to bear more than their equitable share of capital cost 
in relation to the benefits conferred. Banberry Dev. Corp. •. 
South Jordan Citv. 631 P.2d 903#{Ut. 1981). 
1 it •*•-* 
,„„ ,# so, in -hat amount. 
-or failure to »a>ce discovery and. x-
.«,* hv the pleadings. 
0. All other theori.* raised b, 
,
 t h a i r demand for * 1*^ t-i*i. 
- — - " • — — . ; : ; « - » - — - -
-~A tar -hi* reason tnat tnc p 
trial is denied for .he ,_c_ 8m of w . t Jordan 
A in this case is whether Section 9-C 8(2) 
determined in this case
 invoive« « l w 
C U , Ordinance 33 is constitutionally valid. » « 
determination primarily. 
DATED this da, of August, 1982. 
D¥ THE COURT: 
Honorable- Kenneth Rigtrup 
•-„ AMENDED ORDER to: 
copy ot the- foregoing AMENDS*. 
STZPHEH HOMER 
1850. West 7800 South 
w.»t Jordan City, "tan 
on t h i s day of August. 1 9 " -
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EXHIBIT C 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
April 6, 1987 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Robert J. DeBry 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4001 South 700 East, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
John Call and Clark Petition for Writ of Mandamus 
Jenkins, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants 
v. No. 870098 
Honorable Dauid B. Oee and 
Any Successory Judges of the 
Third District Court, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
THIS DAY, Petition for Writ of Mandamus is grahted and mrit 
shall issue. 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A084 9 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
4001 South 700 East, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
JOHN CALL and CLARK 
JENKINS, , 
Plaintiffs- ] 
Appellants, 
vs. 
HONORABLE DAVID B. DEE 
and ANY SUCCESSOR JUDGES ] 
OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
Defendants- ] 
Respondents. 
| MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
> OF PETITION FOR 
1 WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
! case No. SI0011 
FACTS 
Plaintiffs are real estate developers. Plaintiffs 
subdivided property in the City of West Jordan. West Jordan 
imposed a 7% fee as a condition for approval of the subdivi-
sion. Plaintiffs challenged the 7% on constitutional and 
other other grounds. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This case has been before this Court on -three 
prior occasions: Call v. Ciry of vest Jordan, 6C6 P.2d 217 
(Uz. 1S79) {Call I); C-ll v. City of West Jcrdan, €14 P.2d 
FILE copy 
1257 (Ut. 1980) (Call II); and, Call v, City of West Jordan, 
727 P.2d 180 (Ut. 1986) (Call III). 
In the final pretrial skirmishing (prior to Call 
III)/ Judge Rigtrup reversed the normal burden of producing 
9 
evidence. (Exhibit B.) Specifically, the court ruled: 
The trial is hereby bifurcated into two 
phases. At the first phase, defendant 
shall have the burden of producing 
evidence on the following issues: 
* * * * 
Whether Section 9-6-8(2) of West Jordan 
City Ordinance 33 was prepared by the 
Planning and Zoning Commission, and 
whether a public hearing was held prior 
to promulgating the ordinance. 
(Exhibit B at paragraphs 1 and 2(d).) 
This Court approved of that ruling: 
As mentioned above, the pretrial order 
placed upon West Jordan the burden of 
making a prima facie showing that it has 
satisfied the requirements of Section 
10-9-25. We hold as a matter of law 
that it failed to carry this burden. 
727 P.2d at 182. 
Thereafter, West Jordan ^iled a Petition for 
Rehearing in this Court. The petition argues, in part, 
that: 
The testimony presented by the defendant 
concerning the public hearing was merely 
in compliance with the Court's pretrial 
order. That evidence was not neces-
Eventually, Judge Dee presided at the trial. 
This was imposed as a discovery sanction. 
2 
sarily a complete presentation of the 
defendantf s case. . .the City should 
have the opportunity to make a complete 
showing of the public hearing. (Empha-
sis from original.) 
The petition for rehearing was denied and the case 
was remitted to the Third Judicial District Court. 
In the Third Judicial District Court, West Jordan 
filed a Motion to Allow Amendment to Pleadings and/or 
Reopening of Case to Allow Presentation of Defendant's Case 
in Chief. (Exhibit C.) 
the motion was supported by a memorandum. (Exhib-
it D.) In that memo, West Jordan again argues that: 
The testimony presented by the defendant 
concerning the public hearing was merely 
in compliance with the Court's pretrial 
order. That evidence was not necessari-
ly a complete presentation of the 
defendant's case. 
* * * * 
The City should have the opportunity to 
make a complete showing as to the 
holding of the public hearing. (Empha-
sis from original.) 
On his last day on the bench, the motion was 
granted by Judge Dee. (Exhibit A.) Specifically, Judge Dee 
ruled that West Jordan could reopen its case-in-chief to 
present some new evidence as to whether or not a public 
hearing had been held. 
3 
?RGUMENT 
The ruling by Judge Dee violates §78-7-19, U.C.A. 
If an application for an order, made to 
a judge of a court in which the action 
or proceeding is pending, is refused in 
whole or in part, . .no subsequent 
application for the same order can be 
made to any other judge, except to a 
higher court, . • 
In substance, West Jordan has persuaded Judge Dee 
to overrule Judge Rigtrup. Indeed, West Jordan has per-
suaded Judge Dee to overrule this Court! The motion was 
completely frivolous. Judge Dee had no power and no dis-
cretion to act on that issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The write of mandamus should issue vacating Judge 
Dee's recent order (Exhibit A), which reopened the trial. 
DATED this Aj 4h day of ^^^(LkCT) ,
 1987# 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
MANDAMUS (Call, et al. v. Honorable David B. Dee, et al.), 
was mailed, U.S., Mail, postage prepaid, this day of 
Cl>cr}s t 1987, to the following: 
Stephen G. Homer 
West Jordan City Attorney 
1850 West 7800 South 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
a!tLs 
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EXHIBIT D 
PETERSEN, SORENSEN & BROUGH 
CtRTIflCO PUtUC ACCOUNTANTS 
MCM8CRS OF 
AMCRICAN INSTITUTE OF 
CIRTlf lLO * U 8 U t ACCOUNTANTS 
UTAH ASSOCIATION OF 
September 11, 1981 CIRTIFICO PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 
Third Judicial r ;>:"M *\\.r: 
Of Salt Lake County 
For The State Of Utah 
RE: OROER APPOINTING MASTERS, C iv i l No. C-78-829 
JOHN CALL AND JOHN CLARK JENKINS - P l a n t i f f s ' 
vs. 
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH - Defendant 
S i r : 
As the appointed master of the court in the above referenced proceeding! 
I have completed a survey of the available accounting records at the City of 
West Jordan. In accordance with this order, the purpose of this survey was 
to determine if the City's records could provide information as to: (1) the 
amount of consideration paid by various Mibdividrrs rein tod tn thn City1*, 
Flood Control and Park Fee Ordinance, (2) wh.it the city did with each fee 
or land rncovcrpd from each subdivide?*, .ind (.1) (••.tin.ilc the ur-l uf extracting 
this information from the City's records. This preliminary report presents 
the results of my survey. 
ACCOUNTING RECORDS AVAILABLE 
For each of the fiscal years ending June 30, 1975 through 1978, the 
following records were available: (1) general ledgers, (2) cash receipt 
journals, (3) cash disbursement journals. These lecgers and journals are the 
complete records kept by the City and it appears that no records are missing. 
£tk,hiT 1 
44 lAtT 7300 SOUTH 
r- • MIOVALC. UTAH 14047 
^ T n U f H O N f : (J01) 5665644 
APPENDIX "D" 
Ouring fiscal year ending June 30, 19/y, m e u i ; ^ — ._ 
accounting system. This system provides generally the same journals and ledgers 
as the prior hand posted records; however, the Cit|y is missing cash receipt 
journals from March 1979 through June 1979. For the fiscal year 1980, all sirnilar 
records are available. 
ACCOUNTS USED FOR FLOOD CONTROL AND PARK FEES 
The City has used a series of accounts within the general fund to account 
for flood control and park fee transactions. The following accounts were used 
in fiscal years 1975 through 1978: 
RECEIPTS 
Flood Control Revenue 
EXPENDITURES 
Flood Control 
Parks - Equipment and Operating 
Parks - Buildings and Grounds 
Parks - Sundry Charges 
Parks - Land Purchases 
Parks - Improvements Other Than 
Parks - Equipment 
Parks - Professional Services 
For fiscal years 1979 and 1980 the following accounts were used: 
RECEIPTS 
Flood Control 
EXPENDITURES 
Flood Control 
Flood Control 
Flood Control 
Flood Control 
Flood Control 
Flood Control 
Flood Control 
Flood Control 
Flood Control 
Flood Control 
Supplies 
Buildings 
- Salaries 
- Benefits 
- Pub!ic Notices 
- Travel 
• Equipment and Supplies Maintenance 
- Professional Services 
- Miscellaneous Supplies 
- Miscellaneous Services 
- Land Acquisitions 
- Improvements Other Than Buildings 
Generally, the same accounts were used year to year except in 1979 and 
1980 the expenditure accounts were all under the general account t i t l e of 
flood control rather than parks. 
SURVEY WORK PERFORMED 
With an understanding of the accounting records available and the accounts 
used for the flood control transactions, I selected a few transactions for revie*. 
back to supporting documentation. The transactions I reviewed and my findings 
are presented below: 
Receipts 
1. 7/25/77 GENERAL LEDGER POSTING $ 28,141.89 
This transaction was traced back to two cash receipt documents 
as follows: 
7/20/77 Clark Jenkins $ 16,576.00 Wes Call 
7/20/77 Ensign Dev. 11,565.89 Bunker Hill 
S 2B.14J,fl9 
Cash receipt documents were found and I traced this amount to a 
bank checking account deposit. 
Expenditures 
1. 5/11/77 CHECK NO. 3152 NE1LSEN, MAXWELL & WANGSGARD $ 1,168,21 
This payment was traced back to supporting invoices from Neil sen , 
Maxwell & Wangsgard. The $1,168.21 is part of a total payment of 
$19,215.20 and is supported by the following individual invoices: 
4/11/78 West Jordan - Storm Drainage 
Contract - Project Number 5860-63 
1. Williamsburg Subdivision - area drainage study 
2. Browns Meadow - area drainage study 
3. Area #'s 5 and 6 - area drainage study 
Cost Sunmary: 
Engineer 18.0 hrs. $ 375.0c 
3/10/78 West Jordan - Storm Drainage 
Contract 5860-63 
1. Williamsburg Subdivision - area drainage study 
Cost Summary: 
Engineer 1.5 hrs. 33.o; 
4/11/78 Project Number 5878-53 
1. Professional engineering services for construction 
surveying and inspection for the 2700 West Storm 
Drain Project 
Cost Summary: 
Project Inspection 28 hrs. 
Surveyor 20 hrs. 
Technician 2 hrs. 
Travel t 31.64 759.26 
$ 1,168.21 
2. 5/18/78 CHECK NO. 3163 NOLAN & SON S 10.000,00 
This check is a partial payment on a total invoice of $19,644.61 
related to installation of the 2700 West stonn drain. 
3. 5/31/78 CHECK NO. 3260 NICK J . C0LLESS1DES $ 472.00 
The $472.00 is part of a total check for $1,172.00. $472.00 was 
traced to a supporting invoice related to legal services on the CALL 
et, a l . vs. West Jordan case. 
4. 11/22/76 CHECK NO. 0889 TONNESEN SPRINKLER COMPANY $ 11.150.C 
This transactions was traced to a supporting invoice for 
sprinkling systems as follows: 
Harvest Estates No. 1 $ 4,765-C 
Dixie Valley No. 9 $ 6,385.C 
$ 1 M 5 0 . : 
This payment is for 8 acres of ground at $10,000 per acre. The total 
property purchase was 15.371 acres at 7000 South, 3200 West. A second 
check for the balance of $73,710.00 was paid on the same date and was 
charged to the Parks - Land Purchases account. 
Conclusions 
Wjth the understanding I gained from the sample tests above, I can 
draw the following conclusions about the rest of the work the court has 
requested: 
Cash receipts are generally adequately documented, and I can determine 
from the existing accounting records the individual contributions made 
by each subdivider. 
In order to determine the way the City has spent each individual subdivide 
fees, I will need to perform the following steps: 
Step 1 
I will need to determine what each of the individual flood control and 
parks disburesments were for. From the sample tests above, I beleive 
that the transactions are well documented and that I can determine the 
purpose of each disbursement. 
Steo 2 
After I find a general description of the transaction provided in Step 1, 
I will nged to determine who benefited from each individual trpostctinn. 
From the sample tests above, I know that often the accounting records do 
not provide an explanation of the individual benefits to subdividers. 
For example, from the accounting records, I have no way of knowing who 
benefited from the $10,000 payment for the 2700 West storm drain. To 
determine the individual subdivider*s benefit from this type of 
transaction, I will need the nelp of an engineer who is competent in 
flood control systems and parks planning. With engineering help, I 
beleive that an allocation of these joint benefits can be made to 
individual subdividers; however, various subjective decisions would 
have to be made from the facts available on eacn transaction. Also, $UcK 
an analysis would require a review of all related transactions in each 
fiscal year, I ao not beleive that a single subdivide^ c?n be ex&mngri 
individual 1y. 
Step 3 
From Steps 1 and 2 I will have an understanding of what all the flood 
control and parks transactions were for and who benefited from them. 
Step 3 requires additional depth in the benefit analysis because the 
City has spent money for flood control and parks that has come from 
sources other than Flood Control and Park Ordinance fees. These other 
funds can come from Federal or State sources or from general tax revenues 
For clarification in language, I will call these other funds "general 
city funds" and I will call the Flood Control and Park Ordinance fees 
"flood control fees'1. The City has not segregated funds from these two 
sources; therefore, the accounting records do not reflect which source of 
money is being used when a disbursement is being made. The problem at 
this point is, then, that for some types of projects, it appears that the 
City is responsible for providing a benefit to subdividers from general 
City funds and that this benefit is not properly considered as part of the 
benefit the City is responsible to provide individual subdividers for 
their flood control fee. (Note that Step 2 has given the subdividers crec 
for the benefits from these general City funds.) 
The objective of Step 3, then, is tn attempt to determine what (if ar 
portion of a subdivider's total benefit (from Step 2) was provided from tt 
City's general obligation and to subtract this benefit from the subdivider 
total benefit. This will lc3ve only the pure flood control benefit for 
each subdivider. To accomplish Step 3, I would have to determine if any 
general City obligation for benefit to subdividers existed for each flood 
control and park transaction and project. Since this information is not 
provided in the existing accounting records, it will have to come from other 
records and, again, from the help of a trained engineer. It is also possible 
that such information may not be available at all for some transactions, 
therefore, the analysis would not be possible. 
PROPERTY RECEIVED AS FEES 
The City has on occasion received property as a fee from the Flood 
Control and Parks Fee Ordinance. These transactions are not recorded in 
the accounting records of the City but are recorded in the minutes of the 
City. I reviewed one of these transactions and found it to be in good 
order. I did not, however, attempt to follow the transactions past the 
entry in the minutes. I should be able* to follow these transactions into 
recorded deeds and perform procedures similar to those provided above. 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNIFORM MUNICIPAL 
FISCAL PROCEDURES ACT FOR UTAH CITIES 
The court was somewhat confusing in it's instructions related to my 
determination of West Jordan City's compliance with the Uniform Municipal 
Fiscal Procedures Act for Utah Cities (the Act). Paragraph 2 of the order 
which stated "The master shall report to the court as to whether the documents 
are being kept in accordance with Utah Fiscal Procedures Act and general 
accounting principles" was striken from the work I was instructed to do. However. 
Paragraph 3 states that "If the documents are not being kept according to regular! 
established accounting principles in accordance with the Fiscal Procedures Act, 
the master shall also estimate the cost of the report had the records been prepare 
according to generally accepted accounting principles arrd/or in compliance with 
the Fiscal Procedures Act". This paragraph requires me indirectly to determine 
compliance in these two areas. I feel that the Act is more applicable to this 
situation than generally accepted accounting principles, therefore, I will 
present only my opinions related to the Act-
First, Section 10-10-29 FUNDS TO BE ESTABLISHED of the Act states that 
"Each City shall maintain, according to its own needs, some or all of the followi 
funds or ledgers in its system of accounts: (paragraph (9)) A ledger or group 
of accounts in which to record the details relating to the general fixed assets 
of the municipality." West Jordan City did not maintain a property ledger 
until recently, however, within the scope of this survey I could not determine 
its accuracy related to prior transactions. 
Second, Paragraph (2) of Section 10-10-29 also requires a City to maintain 
"Special revenue funds, as required, such as a fund financed by a special-purpose 
tax being earmarked for a specific purpose", and paragraph (4) requires "... 
capital improvement funds to otherwise account for funds allotted annually to 
specific construction or improvement projects derived from sources other that the 
proceeds of general obligation bond issues or general long-term debt." 
Neither of these paragraphs are exactly related to the accounting problem 
of flood control and parks fees, however, I think that they both provide guidance 
on the proper method of recording these transactions. First, while these fees 
may not be taxes, ! think they are within the theme of paragraph (2) in that 
they are for a special purpose and earmarked specifically for that purpose. 
Secondly, these fees were collected for flood control and parks construction or 
improvement projects, therefore, paragraph (4) seems to apply. The City has 
recorded these transactions as year-to-year revenue and expenditures and has 
not given them special accounting treatment. 
With the guidance of paragraphs (2), (4) and (9) of Sections 10-10-29, 
I conclude that the fees should have had special accounting treatment* First, 
I think the City should have prepared a fixed asset ledger that recorded a 
description of all fixed assets purchased, date of purchase, cost and any other 
applicable information. This ledger should also have included the property 
received as Flood Conrol and Parks Ordinance Fees. Secondly, I think that the 
Flood Control and Parks Fee receipts should have been recorded directly into a 
restricted equity account within the general fund, which would represent earmark 
funds for flood control and parks. As the City determined allowable uses for 
these funds, they should have made a transfer from the restricted equity account 
to a revenue account. It appears that the expenditures have been recorded prope 
This accounting method would have provided an equity account that reflected any 
unused portion of these funds collected. It would not however, require the City 
to document the individual subdividers benefit from the expenditures or how his 
individual funds were spent. I cannot find any provision in the Act that requir 
accounting records to be maintained so as to document an individual's benefit or 
how an individual's funds were spent. 
COSTS TO COrPlCTE THE EXAMINATION 
I can objectively evaluate the time necessary to analyze the receipts from 
subdividers and the general nature of the total disbursements by the City. I 
have to use a very subjective analysis, however, in determining the time necessa 
to allocate the benefits of all costs to individual subdividers and to determine 
aay general obligation benefit that I refered to in Step 3 above. For this reas 
I must provide the following very broad range of fees to complete this work: 
Minimum Maximum 
Estimated Estimated 
Fee Fee 
Analysis of fees received 
and the general nature of the 
disbursements (Step 1) S 2,400 S 3,700 
Step 2 5,000 7,600 
Step 3 5,000 7,600 
Total S 12,400 $ 18,900 
FINAL REPORT 
If the court should request me to complete this work, I will issue our 
final report in accordance with Statement on Auditing Standards No. 35 -
Special Reports Applying Agreed Upon Procedures to Specified Elements, 
Accounts or Items of a Financial Statement, issued by the Auditing Standards 
Executive Committee of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. 
Because my procedures will not constitute a complete examination in accordance 
with generally accepted auditing standards, I will not express an opinion on 
the financial statements of the City. Also, if I was to perform additional 
procedures or if I was to perform an audit in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards, other matters might come to my attention that I would report 
to the court. 
Again, it is a subjective matter of determining how much the above fee 
estimates would be if the records had been prepared in accordance with the 
accounting methods I have suggested in my comments related to compliance with 
the Uniform Fiscal Procedures Act for Utah Cities- It would obviously be easier 
to find recorded property received for fees, and any unused fees could easily 
be identified in total. These records would not help in the analysis of the 
individual subdividers benefit from expenditures or in determining how his 
individual fees were spent. It appears reasonable that these records would hav 
reduced the fees above by 10 to 20 percent. If the city would have kept indiv, 
records for each subdivider on specifically how his n»ney was spent or how he 
benefited fro. joint expenditures, then the above fees would have b duced 
substantially, but as I stated above. I cannot find a requirement that such recc 
were necessary. 
I will be happy to discuss these matters in detail at the courts request. 
^^hn I. Brough, Partter 
Petersen, Sorensen I Brough 
